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1. Introduction
After the baby boom has petered out, below-reproduction fertility rates have become
a great problem in a number of developed countries. As a reaction, the concerned
governments have expanded fertility-related transfer schemes to support families and
promote fertility. Note that these schemes vary across time and space. In addition to
free school and health care, various financial family support systems exist. To name
just the two main types: the child benefit is increasing with the number of children
(below working age), while the family tax deduction is a child benefit which only applies
up to the income tax obligation. These fertility-related systems operate together with
an income-dependent tax system and even interact with the public pension system. In
this paper, we will create and analyze a model of optimal income- and fertility-related
transfers when fertility is endogenous.
To model such transfer systems, the framework of a Stackelberg-game is used: the
government announces a transfer rule, and calculating with the transfers, the workers
decide on their individual optima. Anticipating these reactions, the government deter-
mines the transfer rule by maximizing a social welfare function. (Even if the government
does not maximize any social welfare function, this technique is appropriate for eval-
uating different transfer systems.) Taking into account individual and social budget
constraints calls for a general equilibrium analysis.
In models of endogenous fertility (e.g. Becker, 1960; 1991 and Becker and Barro,
1988), when workers decide on their fertility, they consider that more children means
that younger worker consume less but have more joy. As is usual, a unisex world is
heroically assumed, where the number of children can be any positive real, including
the irrational number
√
2.
Though family support and pension appear as Siamese twins (e.g. Groezen, Leers
and Meijdam (2003), for short, GLM theoretically and Ga´bos, Ga´l and Ke´zdi (2009)
empirically), in this paper we shall neglect the latter and try to deepen the analysis of the
former. To study the properties of a child benefit system, one can neglect income (wage)
taxation. But to analyze a family tax deduction system, one needs also model a tax
system which redistributes incomes from richer adults to poorer ones, namely provides
basic income to every adult. And then it is natural to model wage heterogeneity as well.
Unfortunately, this dimension has been much neglected in the theoretical literature on
fertility-related transfers. Making up this omission is the main aim of the present paper.
In contrast, certain applied modelers analyzed these complications in much detail but
they constructed the social welfare function to fit the real data rather than deriving the
optimum (e.g. Haan and Wrohlich, 2011).
Deviating from earlier models (e.g. GLM and Simonovits (2013)) but following
Simonovits (2015), we shall assume that the raising costs are proportional to post-tax
incomes rather than independent of them. This modification makes the budget condition
nonlinear in fertility and more complicated than its linear precursors. But without this
change, the role of generous benefits for low income adults would be underestimated,
especially if the basic income is modest. Appendix B outlines the earlier model.
We also modified the framework in another dimension: to the generation of young
workers who raise their children, we added the generation of old workers not raising
children. (Note that Pestieau and Ponthier (2015) also have two rather than one working
generation but they allow both young and old workers raise children.) That way we
1
have got rid of the false identity of the working and the raising periods. On the other
hand, the originally static model has become dynamic: the current fertility strongly
depends on past average fertility, causing a lot of complications.
To simplify the analysis, first a child benefit system, then a family tax deduction
system is studied. In our model, the personal income tax is simply proportional to the
wage. Direct redistribution among the adults is achieved via a uniform basic income,
while the child benefit is proportional to the number of children. For simplicity, the
young worker’s utility function is an additive logarithmic function of the young and old
worker’s consumption and of fertility (cf. GLM).
Our social welfare function is the expected value of the young workers’ maximal
lifetime utilities. (Unlike in previous models of ours, now there is no need to assume that
the government attaches a higher preference for having children than the parents do.)
Since the (pre-tax) wages, the labor supply and the share of reported earning are given,
we also fix the tax rate, and look for the socially optimal basic income plus either the
benefit rate or the tax deduction rate. (Otherwise we could claim the social optimality
of full income equality. Furthermore, for a fixed tax rate, only the introduction of a
basic income makes room for a changing child benefit rate.)
We have three qualitative analytical results for the child benefit system. Theorem
1: the wage-specific fertility rate is an increasing function of the child benefit rate, a
decreasing function of the basic income and again an increasing function of the balanced
child benefit rate (when the exogenously given tax covers both the benefits and the basic
income). Moreover, the higher the wage, the weaker are these influences. Theorem 2:
the steady-state fertility is an increasing function of the child benefit rate. Theorem
3: for any past average fertility rate below 1, a low enough benefit is better than no
benefit.
Turning to the family tax deduction system and confining the examination to two
types (with low and high wages), the optimal tax deduction rate is a corner solution,
where the tax obligation of the low-paid worker just equals the tax deduction. On the
one hand, if the tax rate is high, the wage distribution is modestly unequal and the past
average fertility is high, then the benefit system is more efficient than the deduction
system is. Even the pure basic income system may overtake the deduction system. On
the other hand, if the tax rate is low, the wage distribution is very unequal and the
past average fertility is low, then the opposite holds. It is to be underlined that in
practice, the family tax deduction system may be very far from this optimum, because
the personal income tax rate is so low that only the high earners can use the deduction
sufficiently. Though the model is rather theoretical, we have to support our incomplete
analytical results with numerical illustrations.
We call the reader’s attention to our model’s limitations within the theoretical field:
sterility is neglected (for asymmetric information, see Cremer, Gahvari and Pestieau,
2008), the labor supply is fixed (for flexible labor, see Fenge and Meier, 2009) and differ-
ences in the relative raising costs and the utility functions, especially in the parameter
of relative utility of a child are glossed over (cf. Simonovits, 2013). The role of social
norms are also neglected (for its analytical treatment, see e.g. Lindbeck, Nyberg and
Weibull (1999); for a rich empirical discussion of these issues in developing countries, see
Banerjee and Duflo (2011), Chapter 5). The activities occurring outside the market are
especially important in raising children (e.g. Lee and Mason eds. (2011) and Ga´l, Szabo´
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and Vargha, 2014) but they are also skipped over. Murphy (2006) applied agent-based
modeling to investigate the role of assortative mating on population growth. Further
research will clarify how much the message of the paper changes if these complexities
are taken into account.
The remainder is organized as follows: Section 2 investigates the special model of
child benefits. Section 3 discusses a similar model of family tax deduction. Section 4
numerically checks the robustness of our results and Section 5 concludes. Proofs are
relegated to Appendix A and a widespread approximation is analyzed in Appendix B.
2. Child benefit
In this section, we shall first determine the individually optimal fertility under child
benefits, then deduce the macro relations and finally illustrate the results numerically.
Individually optimal fertility
In our model, there is a unisex population, where young workers give birth to children,
raise them, together with old workers they pay taxes to finance child benefits and a
universal basic income. For simplicity, there is neither saving nor discounting.
Every young worker in our population is characterized by her pre-tax wage w which is
preserved for old age. The wages are distributed according to a probability distribution
function F and the distribution defines a corresponding expectation operator E. Any
young worker can freely choose the number of her children, denoted by n. The transfer
system has two objectives: (i) to diminish pre-tax wage inequalities and (ii) to finance
a part of the raising costs. Every worker receives basic income γ. A worker, earning
wage w pays tax θw. A young worker, who has n children, also receives child benefits
ϕn, ϕ being the child benefit rate.
Denoting the net-of-tax rate by θˆ = 1− θ, the old worker’s net income is equal to
z = θˆw + γ (1a)
and the young worker’s net income is
z + ϕn. (1b)
We assume that the raising cost is proportional to the number of children and the
net income. Denoting the proportionality constant by pi > 0, the raising cost is equal
to pin(z+ϕn), therefore the old and young worker’s consumption are respectively given
by
d = z (2a)
and
c = (1− pin)(z + ϕn), where 0 < n < 1
pi
. (2b)
To avoid absurd cases, we assume that the child benefit is always nonnegative and not
greater than the narrow raising cost: 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ pizm, where zm is the minimal value.
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Assume that any young worker chooses her fertility to maximize an additive loga-
rithmic utility function
U(c, n, d) = log c+ ζ log n+ log d, (3)
where ζ > 0 is the relative individual utility of having children with respect to that of
adult consumption.
Inserting (2) into (3) yields the reduced utility function
u(n) = log(z + ϕn) + log(1− pin) + ζ log n+ log z. (4)
We assume that the workers neglect the impact of their decisions on the tax balance
described in (9) below.
Equating u′s derivative to zero provides the young worker’s optimality condition
0 = u′(n) =
ϕ
z + ϕn
− pi
1− pin +
ζ
n
. (5)
At this point we shall consider the simplest case when there is no child benefit.
Example 1. If there is no child benefit: ϕ = 0, then the balance condition [(9′)
below] is simply θ = γ. The introduction of a pure basic income has no fertility effect,
because the optimal fertility is independent of the net income z:
n0 = n(w, 0, θ) =
ζ
ζ¯pi
. (6o)
We are especially interested in cases, where the fertility is below 1, therefore we shall
assume n0 < 1, i.e. pi > ζ/ζ¯. Then the young worker’s consumption is equal to c0 = z/ζ¯,
independently of the per-child raising cost pi.
Returning to the general case of ϕ > 0, we present the explicit solution of the
wage-specific (unbalanced) fertility.
Lemma 1. In a transfer system with basic income γ and child benefit rate ϕ, the
optimal fertility of a young worker with a narrow income z = θˆw+γ is the positive root
of the quadratic equation
E(n,w, ϕ, γ) = (2 + ζ)piϕn2 + ζ¯(piz − ϕ)n− ζz = 0, where ζ¯ = 1 + ζ, (6)
namely
n(w,ϕ, γ) =
−B +√B2 + 4AC
2A
, (7)
where
A = (2 + ζ)piϕ, B = ζ¯(piz − ϕ) and C = ζz. (8)
Though formulas (7)–(8) are helpful in the numerical calculations, their analytical
use is very limited. In contrast, (5) is very useful, implying
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Corollary. The individual optimal fertility is an increasing function of the benefit
rate ϕ, a decreasing function of the wage w and of the basic income γ. The higher the
wage, the weaker is the impact of the rise in the transfer rates ϕ and γ.
Indeed, consider the optimality condition (5) and increase ϕ, then the declining
curve shifts to the right, leading to a higher n(w,ϕ, γ). The opposite holds for γ. The
higher the w, the higher is z, thus the right hand side of (5) decreases.
Macrorelations
Having finished the individual analysis, we consider the whole population with a given
wage distribution and assume that the average wage is Ew = 1, regardless of age. We
have four overlapping generations, where N denotes the size of generation born in the
current period and N−i denotes that of last but i period, i = 1, 2, 3. Then the current
and past average fertilities are equal ν = En = N/N−1 and ν−1 = En−1 = N−1/N−2,
respectively. Since pensioners are neglected, N−3 is irrelevant.
We shall now discuss the balance condition of the tax system in the current period.
On average, the tax is the sum of the child benefit and the basic income, the former
being the product of the child benefit rate and the number of children. Hence
(N−1 +N−2)θ = ϕN + (N−1 +N−2)γ. (9)
Using definitions N−1 = ν−1N−2 and N = νν−1N−2, (9) simplifies to the fertility
equation
(1 + ν−1−1)(θ − γ) = ϕν(ϕ, γ), (9′)
where ν(ϕ, γ) = En(w,ϕ, γ) is the average current fertility as a function of the child
benefit rate ϕ and the basic income γ, ν−1−1 = 1/ν−1..
Before presenting the involved analysis, we display another very simple special case.
Example 2. Assume homogeneous wages: w ≡ 1, and exclude basic income: γ = 0,
hence z = 1 − θ. To simplify the calculations, we are looking for the stationary case
n = 1, when the balance condition reduces to ϕ = 2θ. Substituting into (6) directly:
E(1, 1, 2θ, 0) = 2(2 + ζ)piθ + ζ¯(pi(1− θ)− 2θ)− ζ(1− θ) = 0.
By simple calculation, the corresponding tax rate is given by
θ1 =
ζ¯pi − ζ
2 + ζ − (3 + ζ)pi ∈ (0, 1) if
ζ
1 + ζ
< pi <
1 + ζ
2 + ζ
.
We return now to the general problem. For a fixed tax rate θ, a child benefit rate
ϕ and a past fertility rate ν−1, one has to substitute (7)–(8) into (9′), and solve the
resulting implicit equation for γ[ϕ, ν−1] called balanced basic income:
(1 + ν−1−1)(θ − γ[ϕ, ν−1]) = ϕν(ϕ, γ[ϕ, ν−1]). (9′′)
We are looking for the conditions guaranteeing the existence and uniqueness of the
balanced income, moreover γ[ϕ, ν−1] is decreasing in ϕ. Proofs are given in Appendix.
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Theorem 1. Fix the past fertility ν−1 and let ϕm be a positive real number such
that
(1 + ν−1−1)θ > ϕν(ϕ, 0) (10a)
and
−ϕν′γ(ϕ, γ) < 1 + ν−1−1 (10b)
hold for 0 < ϕ < ϕm. Then the balanced basic income γ[ϕ, ν−1] exists, is unique and
decreasing in ϕ and ν(ϕ, γ[ϕ, ν−1]) is increasing in ϕ.
Remarks. Condition (10a) is simple because the right hand side is an increasing
function of ϕ. Condition (10b) is more complex, because the positive number on the
left hand side looks much lower than the right hand side but we are not sure if this is
an effective bound or not.
We can now formulate the fertility dynamics:
ν[ϕ, ν−1] =
(1 + ν−1−1)(θ − γ[ϕ, ν−1])
ϕ
, ϕ > 0. (9′′′)
Note that this relation is essentially independent of the utility function, only the form
of γ[ϕ, ν−1] depends on the optimization framework.
Under certain (unknown) conditions and for a fixed child benefit rate ϕ, there exists
a unique steady-state fertility νo which satisfies
θ = ϕ
νo2
νo + 1
+ γ[ϕ, νo], (9o)
where
νo = En[w,ϕ, νo].
Now we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For a given child benefit rate ϕ, assuming that there exists a unique
steady-state fertility, it is an increasing function of the child benefit rate.
Remark. For any feasible fixed child benefit rate, we conjecture that the fertility
dynamics (9′′′) converges very fast to the steady state. The convergence speed is the
reciprocal of the contraction factor |H ′(νo)|. The fast convergence is obvious for ϕ = 0,
when the dynamics steers fertility to the steady state n0 in just one period, regardless
of the initial fertility ν−1. Our numerical experiments support this hypothesis for ϕ > 0
as well.
To choose the socially optimal transfer system, the government maximizes a utili-
tarian social welfare function:
V [ϕ] = E {log c[w,ϕ] + ζ log n[w,ϕ] + log d[w]} . (11)
We shall prove that some positive child benefit is socially useful, at least if the past
fertility rate was below 1.
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Theorem 3. For any given past average fertility rate ν−1 < 1, the socially optimal
balanced child benefit rate is positive: ϕ∗ > 0.
As is usual, to compare the two systems—basic income combined with child benefits
and pure basic income—from a welfare point of view, we introduce the following concept:
the relative efficiency ε of the combined system with respect to the pure basic income
is equal to that positive real number, multiplying the wages of the no-benefit system by
it, the welfare is equal to that of the benefit system with the original wages. Adding
an argument for the average wage ε in the social welfare function, the corresponding
equation for efficiency is
V (1, ϕ) = V (ε, 0).
Due to the special structure of the utility and the social welfare functions,
V (1, ϕ) = V (1, 0) + log ε, i.e. ε = exp(V (1, ϕ)− V (1, 0)). (12)
Numerical illustrations
To help the understanding of the steady state’s and the welfare function’s behavior,
we shall display numerically the dependence of the optimal outcomes on the balanced
transfer rates. We have only two types, in the base run with earnings wL = 0.5 and
wH = 2, with a common relative raising cost pi = 0.35 and population shares fL = 2/3,
fH = 1−fL = 1/3. We fix the value of the tax rate at θ = 0.3 and choose the preference
parameter: ζ = 0.4. Note that this choice satisfies the condition set in Example 2. For
ϕ = 0, γ = θ and nL = nH = n0 hold (Example 1).
In Table 1 we display the dependence of the steady state fertility as a function of
the child benefit rate. Note that in reality, the pure child benefit rate is very low, in
Hungary, about 2% of the average total wage cost. But including hidden transfers like
free schooling and health care, this rate can be much higher.
As the benefit rate rises from 0 to 0.16 (close to the maximum), the balanced basic
income drops from 0.3 to 0.225 and the steady-state fertility rises from n0 = 0.816 to
1.051.
Table 1. Child benefit rate and steady-state fertility
Child benefit Balanced Steady-state
rate basic income fertility
ϕ γ[ϕ, νo] νo
0 0.300 0.816
0.04 0.284 0.876
0.08 0.267 0.936
0.12 0.247 0.995
0.16 0.225 1.051
Remark. wL = 1/2, fL = 2/3, θ = 0.3.
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Moving from the steady state analysis to the dynamic one, we should pay attention
to the influence of past fertility. Creating Table 2 we fix the past fertility rate, namely
below 1: close to n0, ν−1 = 0.8. As the child benefit rate increases, the relative efficiency
increases less and less and reaches the maximum around ϕ∗ = 0.06. Increasing ϕ until
it almost covers the raising cost of the lower paid type, the fertility of the lower paid
increases much faster than the higher paid’s: nL = 1.127 > 0.939 = nH . Note, however,
that the social welfare slowly sinks, and from ϕ = 0.12 it drops below the no-benefit
level.
Table 2. Impact of the child benefit rate
Child Balanced F e r t i l i t y
benefit basic Low High Relative
rate income w a g e Average efficiency
ϕ γ[ϕ, ν−1] nL nH ν ε
0.00 0.300 0.816 0.816 0.816 1.000
0.06 0.276 0.929 0.859 0.906 1.004
0.12 0.247 1.041 0.902 0.995 0.999
0.17 0.220 1.127 0.939 1.065 0.990
Remark. See Table 1, ν−1 = 0.8.
3. Family tax deduction
There are governments which are worried by the large transfers flowing from high-earner
workers (families) to low-earner ones through child benefits. To mitigate this unwanted
consequence, these governments replace child benefits by family tax deductions. (It
is possible to model a partial replacement but it would unnecessarily complicate the
analysis.) The essence of the family tax deduction is that only the higher wage types
can fully use it: any positive excess transfer e = ϕn(w)− θw is eliminated.
The simplest formulation of the family tax deduction is as follows. Let ψ > 0 be the
child tax deduction rate, i.e. having n children, amount ψn can be deducted from the
proportional personal income tax θw, up to the maximum θw. To avoid absurd cases,
we assume that the family tax deduction is always lower than or equal to the narrow
raising cost: ψ ≤ pizm, where zm corresponding to the minimal wage wm. Let t0 denote
now the tax deducted: t0 = min(θw, ψn). Obviously, if the benefit is so low or the tax
rate is so high that even the minimal wage earner’s tax amount is higher than the family
tax deduction, then the latter reduces to the child benefit. But this has already been
covered in Section 3, therefore we assume that θwm ≤ ψn, where wm is the minimal
wage.
By definition, type w’s old-age consumption is equal to d = z, while its own young-
age consumption is equal to
c = (z + t0)(1− pin) (13)
We have now two domains; slack, denoted by S: θwS > ψnS and tight, denoted
by T : θwT ≤ ψnT. (The status of the demarcation line θw = ψn is ambiguous.)
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Correspondingly, t0S = ψn and t0T = θw. Then (13) branches off into
cS = (zS + ψnS)(1− pinS), zS = θˆwS + γ (13S)
and
cT = (wT + γ)(1− pinT). (13T )
Then there are two separate regimes with their own fertility optima. Lemma 1
provides nS for ψ replacing ϕ in (7)–(8), while nT for ϕ = 0 and θ = 0, i.e. (6o). It can
be shown that nS(w,ψ, γ) > nT. It is especially disturbing that the transition from S
into T is discontinuous: the optimal transfer drops a lot due to a minor tax rate rise!
To formulate the new balance condition, we repeat the argument leading to (9). But
now we take into account the partition along S − T , which depends on the parameter
vector (w,ψ, γ). For convenience, we assume that the relevant functions nS(w,ψ, γ) and
nT(w,ψ, γ) are also defined outside their natural domains, being equal to zero outside
their proper domains. Subindexes S and T refer to these restricted expectations. The
reformulated balance equation (cf. (9′)) is as follows:
(1 + ν−1−1)(θ − γ) = ψESnS(w,ψ, γ) + θETw. (14)
Our social welfare function remains basically the same as above, only ψ replaces ϕ.
Due to its simplicity, it is worth discussing the two-type case of family tax deduction.
Example 3. In the two-type case, the low-wage type is tight, the high-wage type
is slack. Furthermore, at the social optimum, the low wage type’s family tax deduction
is equal to her tax: ψ∗nL = θwL. Inserting (6o), our optimality condition becomes
ψ∗ =
ζ¯piθwL
ζ
. (15)
Substituting (15) into (14) and using (7)–(8) yield an equation for γ[ψ∗, ν−1].
It is easy to grasp that in general the optimal family tax deduction is far from being
socially optimal. Due to the elimination of the excess transfer, the low-wage type’s
fertility is as low as n0 in (6o) and the corresponding net income is only yL = wL + γ,
which is lower than in the pure basic income system: yoL = θˆwL + θ. The high-wage
type’s fertility is higher than n0 but the additional resource brings less gain in her
consumption and child welfare than the loss is in the low-wage type’s welfare.
We continue the numerical illustrations. For θ = 0.3, the optimal tax deduction rate
is ψ∗ = 0.184 and the corresponding basic income γ∗ = 0.230. The fertility rates are
respectively nL = 0.816, nH = 0.948 and ν = 0.860. The relative efficiency is ε = 1.004,
just the same as the child benefit system’s.
4. Check of robustness
In this Section we shall check the robustness of our numerical results. We also add a new
indicator to be called the double weighted fertility: νw = E(wn(w)), where the wage
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dependent fertilities n(w) are also weighted by the parents earnings, approximating the
average quality of children.
Creating Tables 3a and b, the outcomes of the socially optimal child benefit system
reported separately, while the low wage rises from 0.5 to 0.75 and independently, the low
earners’ frequency drops from 2/3 to 1/3. Note that the high wage changes according
to wH = (1− fLwL)/fH . If the wages are given, wL < 1 < wH , then the corresponding
frequency is determined as fL = (wH − 1)/(wH − wL). To help the reader, we shall
display fL in Tables 3a–4a, and wH in Tables 3b–4b.
It may be surprising that the socially optimal benefit rate and the balanced basic
income are insensitive to the wage and frequency distribution, they are around 0.07
and 0.27, respectively. The same invariance applies to the aggregate fertility (around
0.91), the wage-weighted fertility (around 0.89) and the relative efficiency (around 1.003–
1.004). We shall see in Appendix B that in the approximation, this invariance of average
fertility is exact. The efficiency gain may seem to be modest, it is usual in such welfare
calculations. The only noticeable change occurs within the fertilities: the lower wage
earner’s fertility varies between 0.92 to 0.95, while the higher wage earner’s between
0.86 and 0.90.
Table 3a. Optimal child benefits for varying wages and frequencies: fertilities
LE Child Balanced F e r t i l i t y Double
Low fre- benefits basic Low High Relative weighted
wage quency rate income w a g e Average efficiency fertility
wL fL ϕ
∗ γ[ϕ∗, ν−1] nL nH ν ε νw
0.50 0.667 0.065 0.274 0.938 0.863 0.913 1.004 0.888
0.500 0.068 0.273 0.944 0.877 0.911 1.003 0.894
0.333 0.071 0.271 0.950 0.890 0.910 1.003 0.900
0.75 0.667 0.070 0.272 0.920 0.879 0.906 1.003 0.899
0.500 0.071 0.272 0.921 0.890 0.905 1.003 0.902
0.333 0.072 0.271 0.923 0.897 0.905 1.003 0.903
Remark. LE = low earner, ν−1 = 0.8, θ = 0.3
Turning to the details of consumption, Table 3b shows that as wL and wH change,
the low earners’ consumption at young and old ages increase. Note that the high earner’s
old-age incomes and the lifetime utilities decrease when fL drops or wL rises, since wH
drops.
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Table 3b. Optimal child benefits for varying wages and frequencies: consumption
L o w e a r n e r s H i g h e a r n e r s
younger older younger older
wage c o n s u m p t i o n wage c o n s u m p t i o n
wL cL dL wH cH dH
0.5 0.460 0.624 2.000 1.208 1.674
0.623 1.500 0.958 1.323
0.621 1.250 0.833 1.146
0.75 0.584 0.797 1.500 0.958 1.322
0.797 1.250 0.833 1.147
0.796 1.125 0.771 1.059
Remark. Table 3a
Turning to the socially optimal family tax deduction system, Tables 4a and b are
more varied. By (15), the optimal tax deduction rate ψ∗ rises with wL, from 0.184 to
0.274. The low-earner’s fertility rate now stagnates at nL = n0, while the high earner’s
fertility rises from nH = 0.948 (at wL = 0.5 and fL = 2/3) to 1.117 (at wL = 0.75 and
fL = 1/3). The average fertility also increases, but note that when at transition from
wL = 0.5 and fL = 1/3 to wL = 0.75 and fL = 2/3, the average fertility drops from
0.94 to 0.9. The relative efficiency is sinking from 1.004 to 0.984.
Table 4a. Optimal family tax deductions for varying wages and frequency
Tax
LE deduc- Balanced F e r t i l i t y Double
Low fre- tion basic Low High Relative weighted
wage quency rate income w a g e Average efficiency fertility
wL fL ψ
∗ γ[ψ∗, ν−1] nL nH ν ε νw
0.50 0.667 0.184 0.230 0.816 0.948 0.860 1.004 0.904
0.500 0.227 0.982 0.899 1.001 0.941
0.333 0.223 1.007 0.943 0.997 0.975
0.75 0.667 0.276 0.190 0.816 1.061 0.898 0.998 0.939
0.500 0.183 1.096 0.956 0.991 0.991
0.333 0.175 1.117 1.017 0.984 1.042
Turning to the details of consumption, a similar picture emerges as in Table 3b
but the dropping frequency fL slightly decreases the low earner’s consumption at both
ages. Note that the younger age consumption dramatically increases, while the old-
age consumption dramatically decreases with respect to the benefit system. Their sum
changes from 1.08 to 1.1 but is less different (in the basic run). Turning to high earners,
the total consumption decreases from 2.882 to 2.835 (also in the basic run) but the
much higher fertility compensates for this drop. We must admit that it is not easy to
understand the welfare differences between the two systems.
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Table 4b. Optimal family tax deductions for varying wages and frequencies
L o w e a r n e r s H i g h e a r n e r s
younger older younger older
wage c o n s u m p t i o n wage c o n s u m p t i o n
wL cL dL wH cH dH
0.5 0.521 0.580 2.000 1.205 1.630
0.519 0.577 1.500 0.956 1.277
0.516 0.573 1.250 0.831 1.098
0.75 0.671 0.715 1.500 0.963 1.240
0.666 0.708 1.250 0.838 1.058
0.661 0.700 1.125 0.774 0.963
Until now, we have fixed the tax rate at θ = 0.3. If we change its value between 0
and 0.5, and compare the two systems, we get Tables 5 and 6.
Starting with the child benefit systems, we see the same invariance as before in Table
3. The difference between the tax rate and the basic income is roughly constant, ap-
proximately 0.024. (Note that in the approximation used in Appendix B, this difference
is exactly constant.) The relative efficiency is above that of the pure tax system by
0.4%. The only irregularity occurs in the interval of unrealistically low the tax rates
[0, 0.06], while θ rises, the low earner’s fertility jumps from 0.816 to 0.95, the optimal
child benefit rate reaches 0.06 and the relative efficiency stabilizes around 1.004. Fur-
ther calculations (not presented here) show that there is a smooth but steep rise in the
optimal rate until θ = 0.06, while nH rises from 0.816 to 0.950.
Table 5. The impact of the tax rate on optimal benefits
Child Balanced F e r t i l i t y Double
Tax benefit basic Low High Relative weighted
rate rate income w a g e Average efficiency fertility
θ ϕ∗ γ[ϕ∗, ν−1] nL nH ν ε νw
0.0 0.000 0.000 0.816 0.816 0.816 1.000 0.816
0.1 0.059 0.076 0.947 0.854 0.916 1.004 0.885
0.2 0.062 0.175 0.943 0.858 0.914 1.004 0.886
0.3 0.065 0.274 0.938 0.863 0.913 1.004 0.888
0.4 0.067 0.373 0.933 0.867 0.911 1.003 0.889
0.5 0.068 0.473 0.927 0.871 0.908 1.003 0.890
Remark. wL = 2/3 and fL = 2/3.
Continuing with the tax deduction system, we see that the difference θ−ψ∗ increases
from 0.023 to 0.122. In 0.1 ≤ θ < 0.3, its relative efficiency is higher; in 0.3 < θ ≤ 0.5,
its relative efficiency is lower than the benefit system’s. Even if the consumption date
were shown as in Tables 3b–4b, it would be difficult to understand the relation between
two sums of six terms.
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Table 6. The impact of the tax rate on optimal deductions
Tax Balanced F e r t i l i t y Double
Tax deduction basic Low High Relative weighted
rate rate income w a g e Average efficiency fertility
θ ψ∗ γ[ψ∗, ν−1] nL nH ν ε νw
0.1 0.061 0.077 0.816 0.855 0.829 1.006 0.842
0.2 0.123 0.154 0.816 0.899 0.844 1.007 0.871
0.3 0.184 0.230 0.816 0.948 0.860 1.004 0.904
0.4 0.245 0.304 0.816 1.002 0.878 1.000 0.940
0.5 0.306 0.378 0.816 1.061 0.898 0.993 0.980
Remark. see Table 5
Finally we illustrate the impact of the past average fertility on the two optima, fixing
the tax rate at θ = 0.3. Table 7 displays the important outcomes while ν−1 changes
between 0.7 and 0.9. The most important impact concerns the optimal child benefit
rate and the basic income: the first drops from 0.118 to 0.028, while the second rises
from 0.252 to 0.289. As a result, all the four fertilities decrease, namely the average one
from 0.991 to 0.858. Here are the details.
Table 7. The impact of the past fertility on optimal benefits
Past Child Balanced F e r t i l i t y Double
average benefit basic Low High Relative weighted
fertility rate income w a g e Average efficiency fertility
ν−1 ϕ∗ γ[ψ∗, ν−1] nL nH ν ε νw
0.70 0.118 0.252 1.036 0.901 0.991 1.010 0.946
0.75 0.088 0.265 0.981 0.879 0.947 1.006 0.913
0.80 0.065 0.274 0.938 0.863 0.913 1.004 0.888
0.85 0.045 0.282 0.901 0.848 0.883 1.002 0.866
0.90 0.028 0.289 0.868 0.836 0.858 1.001 0.847
Remark. See Table 1.
Repeating this calculation for the family tax deduction, the change is mainly limited
to basic income, which drops from 0.235 to 0.225. As a consequence, the relative
efficiency drops from 1.017 to 0.993. Note that for low past fertility, this is much higher
than the child benefit optimum, and for high past fertility, it is much lower.
5. Conclusions
In our very simple model, we studied the interaction of the personal income tax and
fertility-related transfers. We determined analytically the socially optimal child ben-
efit system and the family tax deduction system. At least in our arbitrary numerical
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examples, the socially optimal child benefit system’s efficiency is constant, while the
family tax deduction system’s efficiency sensitively depends on the parameter values of
the tax rate and the wage distribution. On the one hand, if the tax rate is high and the
wage distribution is modestly unequal, than the benefit system is more efficient than
the deduction system is. Then even the pure basic income system may overtake the
deduction system. On the other hand, if the tax rate is low and the wage distribution
is very unequal, than the opposite holds. It is to be underlined that in practice, the
family tax deduction system may be very far from this optimum, when the personal
income tax rate is so low that only the high earners can use the deduction sufficiently.
We warn the reader on the limits of the model. We used the simplest utility function
pair, two logarithmic functions. Even at the modest generalization into CRRA, the
independence of the fertility of the wage in Example 1 (no child benefit) disappears,
therefore the saving of Theorems 1 and 2 requires further nontrivial assumptions. The
neglect of the negative impact of taxation on labor supply and tax reporting further
weakens the force of our numerical examples. The inclusion of labor disutility and
flexible labor supply and tax morale and underreporting would make the model more
realistic and determine the optimal tax rate, would more fully highlight the differences
between the two transfer systems. But these modifications would further complicate
the analysis, therefore we have not used them here. The heterogeneity of the relative
raising cost also deserves an examination.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
Define the balance of the transfer system as
D(ϕ, γ, ν−1) = (1 + ν−1−1)(θ − γ)− ϕν(ϕ, γ)
and consider it as a function of the second variable. Since
D(ϕ, 0, ν−1) = (1 + ν−1−1)θ − ϕν(ϕ, 0) > 0 > D(ϕ, θ, ν−1) = −ϕν(ϕ, θ),
therefore, by Bolzano-theorem, there exists at least one root for D(ϕ, γ, ν−1) = 0.
To prove uniqueness, note that by our second assumption,
D′γ(ϕ, γ, ν−1) = −(1 + ν−1−1)− ϕν′γ(ϕ, γ) < 0 for 0 < ϕ < ϕm.
We shall also need
D′ϕ(ϕ, γ, ν−1) = −ν(ϕ, γ)− ϕν′ϕ(ϕ, γ) < 0
(see Corollary for ν′ϕ > 0).
Using the implicit function theorem,
γ′[ϕ] = −D
′
ϕ
D′γ
< 0.
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Turning to the fertility–benefit rate schedule, take the total derivative of
ν(ϕ, γ[ϕ, ν−1], ν−1) by ϕ:
d
dϕ
ν(ϕ, γ[ϕ, ν−1]) = ν′ϕ + ν
′
γγ
′
ϕ[ϕ, ν−1],
where ν′ϕ > 0 > ν
′
γ , thus the total derivative is positive.
Proof of Theorem 2
We shall rely on the implicit function theorem again. Dropping the superscript o,
introduce notation
G(ϕ, ν) = ϕ
ν2
ν + 1
+ γ[ϕ, ν].
Taking the partial derivatives
G′ϕ =
ν2
ν + 1
+ γ′ϕ[ϕ, ν] and G
′
ν = ϕ
ν2 + 2ν
(ν + 1)2
+ γ′ν [ϕ, ν].
By Theorem 1,
γ′ϕ[ϕ, ν] <
ν2
ν2 + 1
.
We shall demonstrate that γ′ν [ϕ, ν] > 0.
Returning to D(ϕ, γ, ν−1), γ′ν [ϕ, ν] = −D′γ/D′ν−1 , where Dγ < 0 by assumption. A
simple calculation yields
D′ν−1 = (θ − γ)− ϕν(ϕ, γ).
Comparing it to D = 0, yields D′ν−1 > 0. Therefore G
′
ϕ < 0 < G
′
ν , i.e. ν
′(ϕ) =
−G′ϕ/G′ν > 0.
Proof of Theorem 3
The existence of the social optima is obvious. The basic idea is borrowed from the well-
known proof of the envelope-theorem. We shall show V ′[0] > 0. Taking the derivative
of V in (11) with respect to ϕ and using (1b) yield
V ′[ϕ] = E
z′ϕ[w,ϕ] + n[w,ϕ] + ϕn
′
ϕ[w,ϕ]
z[w,ϕ] + ϕn[w,ϕ]
−E pin
′
ϕ[w,ϕ]
1− pin[w,ϕ] + ζE
n′ϕ[w,ϕ]
n[w,ϕ]
+E
z′ϕ[w,ϕ]
z[w,ϕ]
.
Using the individual optimality condition (5), multiplying it by n′ϕ[w,ϕ] and applying
z′ϕ[w,ϕ] = γ′[ϕ] [(1a)], we obtain
V ′[ϕ] = E
γ′[ϕ] + n[w,ϕ]
z[w,ϕ] + ϕn[w,ϕ]
+E
γ′[ϕ]
z[w,ϕ]
.
For ϕ = 0, n[w, 0] = n0, the common denominator is z[w, 0] and the wage-dependent
numerator of V ′(0) is a constant:
2γ′[0] + n0 = n0 − 2 ν−1
ν−1 + 1
n0 =
1− ν−1
ν−1 + 1
n0.
Therefore V ′[0] > 0 if and only if ν−1 < 1.
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Appendix B: Approximation of raising costs
In this Appendix, we shall discuss an approximation of the raising costs, used in the
literature. On the one hand, this simplification opens more room for analytical calcula-
tions and enables us to prove directly some of our theorems above. On the other hand,
it distorts the analysis, causing qualitative and quantitative errors.
Earlier papers (GLM and Simonovits, 2013) made the raising costs independent of
the net income: (pi − ϕ)n, implying young worker’s consumption
c = z − (pi − ϕ)n. (B.1)
Due to (B.1),
u(n) = log(z − (pi − ϕ)n) + ζ logn+ log z, (B.2)
therefore the optimal wage-specific fertility is
n(w,ϕ, γ) =
ζz
ζ¯(pi − ϕ) . (B.3)
Note that contrary to Corollary to Lemma 1, this fertility is an increasing rather than
decreasing function of the wage and the basic income! Taking the expectations on
n(w,ϕ, γ) in (B.3), note that z = θˆw + γ, i.e. Ez = θˆ + γ, i.e. the current average
fertility is given by
ν(ϕ, γ) =
ζ(θˆ + γ)
ζ¯(pi − ϕ) . (B.4)
It is remarkable that the aggregate fertility is now independent of the wage distribution!
In a better approximation, the per child raising costs are not independent of but
proportional to the narrow net income, implying
c = z − (piz − ϕ)n. (B.1′)
This modification would preserve the linearity but the resulting
n(w,ϕ, γ) =
ζz
ζ¯(piz − ϕ) (B.3
′)
would make the average fertility dependent on the wage distribution, preventing simple
aggregation.
Rather than determining the balanced basic income, we introduce the difference
between the tax rate and the basic income: λ = θ − γ (i.e. γ = θ − λ). This is the
part of the tax which finances the child benefits, shortly: earmarked child tax rate. To
shorten (B.4), we introduce notation ω = ζ/[ζ¯(pi − ϕ)], yielding
ν(ϕ, θ − λ) = (1− λ)ω. (B.5)
(Note that for ϕ = 0, ω = n0.) Substitute (B.5) into the balance equation (9.9′):
(1 + ν−1−1)λ = ωϕ(1− λ),
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hence the balanced earmarked child tax rate is equal to
λ[ϕ, ν−1] =
ωϕ
1 + ωϕ+ ν−1−1
.
Note that the balanced earmarked tax rate is independent of the tax rate and is an
increasing function of the child benefit rate. Therefore the balanced basic income is a
decreasing function of the child benefit rate and any increase in the tax rate increases
the income by the same quantity.
Returning to (B.5) yields a simple fertility dynamics:
ν =
ω(1 + ν−1−1)
1 + ωϕ+ ν−1−1
i.e.
ν = H(ν−1) =
ω(1 + ν−1)
1 + (1 + ωϕ)ν−1
. (B.6)
To obtain the steady state, we substitute ν = ν−1 into (B.6). The resulting quadratic
equation
(1 + ωϕ)ν2 + (ω − 1)ν − ω = 0
yields the positive root
νo =
ω − 1 +√(ω + 1)2 + 4ω2ϕ
2(1 + ωϕ)
. (B.7)
Finally we could check the local stability under (B.6). As is well-known, the dynam-
ics is locally stable if |H ′(νo)| < 1 holds. A simple calculation yields the condition of
local stability:
|H ′(νo)| = ω
2ϕ
[1 + (1 + ω + ϕ)νo]2
< 1. (B.8)
By geometric reasoning it could be proved that local stability here implies global sta-
bility.
In summary, we proved
Theorem B.1. In approximation (B.1), the steady-state fertility is determined by
(B.7) and it is locally (and globally) stable if (B.8) holds.
We have tried to give a quite general and plausible condition for (B.8) to hold but
we must be satisfied with numerical simulations presented in Table B.1. We display the
dependence of the approximated steady state fertility as a function of the child benefit
rate. As the benefit rate rises from 0 to 0.08, the balanced basic income drops from
0.3 to 0.259 (the exact value is equal to 0.267 in Table 1) and the steady-state fertility
rises from n0 = 0.816 to 1.015 (the exact value is equal to 0.936). The approximation
is hardly acceptable.
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Table B.1. Child benefit rate and steady-state fertility: approximation
Child benefit Balanced Steady-state Contraction
rate basic income fertility factor
ϕ γ[ϕ, νo] νo |H ′(νo)|
0 0.300 0.816 0
0.04 0.283 0.906 0.009
0.08 0.259 1.015 0.020
0.12 0.226 1.150 0.034
0.16 0.180 1.323 0.052
Remark. See Table 1.
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